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them on occasion to play epistemological chess while Rome burns? Philosophy like democracy needs both the principles of superiority and equality. We need not only what Santayana calls the philosophy of polite America, but also the undogmatic clash of ideas which he attributes to the horde of immigrants. This democratic throng, far from showing any dread of non-conformity, is credited by him with meeting every system of ideas with a frank gaze, and saying:⁵ "Come on, show us what you are good for. We accept no claims; we ask for no credentials; we just give you a chance. Plato, the Pope, and Mrs. Eddy shall have one vote each."

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THE NEW STATE

EVEN in these days of challenging political thought it is not in every bound volume that one encounters so much to bring one sharply to attention as in Miss Follett's *The New State*.¹ "Group organization the solution of popular government" is the subtitle; the purpose of the book is definite and unequivocal; and the author writes with a combination of militant determination and evangelical zeal which arise not merely from strong convictions (which are common enough), but also from a precise knowledge of her own mind and of its logical armament (which is not common). The argumentative forces of *The New State* are effectively martialled; aphorisms stand out from its pages like a bristle of bayonets; there is no intimation of weakness in its junctures and no halt in its forward march; and there is a solid impact in the honesty of its cause. It is the sort of a book that calls for an alert reader, for it commands an easy surrender.

The argument is not complex. The meaning of democracy, in the understanding and lives of democratic peoples, must be recast in order that the thing itself may be made not only real but realizable. Democracy is not what tradition has described it as being; democracy is not particularistic, it is collectivistic; it is not a matter of numbers (votes), it is a matter of relations (groups); it is not an inheritance of rights, it is a creation of rights; before all, it is not made workable through self-surrenders (contracts and compromises), but through self-discoveries (agreements), and the realization of

⁵ *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. VIII., reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. XVI., pp. 104-107.

¹ *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government*. M. P. Follett. Longmans, Green and Co. New York and London, 1918. Pp. vii + 379.

freedom is essentially the development of the power to agree: "*the will to will the common will*," says Miss Follett, "is the core, the germinating center of that large, still larger, ever larger life which we are coming to call the true democracy" (p. 49).

In the concrete, this argumentative background leads to a programme of which outstanding features are: (1) distrust of the ballot: "Ballot-box democracy is what this book is written to oppose" (p. 5); (2) antagonism to party politics: "men will learn that they are not to *influence* politics . . . they are to *be* politics" (p. 240); and (3) a reconstruction of citizenship on the basis of a group consciousness which is the expression of a state organized to promote civic and social activity through civic and social living. This matter of group consciousness and group activity is the crux of the programme. First, it is not a surrender, but a realization of individualism—as Miss Follett defines this. "Individuality is the capacity for union" (p. 62); "an individual is one who is being created *by* society, whose daily breath is drawn *from* society, whose life is spent *for* society" (p. 67); and this leads socially to the conception of freedom as "the harmonious, unimpeded working of the law of one's own nature," which nature "is found only in the whole" (p. 69), and of sovereignty as the collective representation of the will of each by all and of all by each: "each should represent the whole united sovereignty at one point as each individual is his whole group at one point" (p. 285). Second, the group, as an instrument for achieving this, begins with the neighborhood, indeed with the spirit of neighborliness wherever this may be found; and by successive incorporations, not of masses of men but of modes of conduct, eventually becomes broad and solid enough to constitute a society and a state. Miss Follett is modest in regard to one essential, namely, the order of procedure in the process of group incorporation. Clearly, the neighborhood group is the first prop of her faith; but along with it are occupational, religious, and other organizations which should not be ignored. She envisages all of these, in her fulfilled state, as entering into the web of social representation which is the state; but she does not suggest any definite plan for their accommodation. She fears, and rightly, the dangers of a mere transverse grouping, such as is represented by occupational alliances, by labor versus capital, as well as by the system of political parties. She suggests, and rightly, that the truest safeguard against the mechanism and bossism which such an organization invites is the development of neighborhood solidarities, which (to use a word which is not hers) must rest ultimately upon a local patriotism. But she recognizes, as all must, that the course of political safety to-day is the course of political

boldness, and that it is no portion of the task of the hour to reject the instruments offered because they are attended by dangers; every mode of group organization must be utilized, and all must find their place in the readjusted state.

With the practical programme suggested in *The New State* I am in hearty concord. I believe that the first step into a brighter future must be the expansion of local self-government into a true "neighborhood" organization devoted to a discovery of the betterment of the neighborhood life. I believe also that the broader organization of states and civilizations must embrace and encourage groupings of men having common understandings and common interests—occupational and ideal. In other words it is the business of society to see that the broad interests of men find recognition, and that economic and political machinery be not allowed to become the instruments of self-seeking and particularistic ambitions. In another respect, I fail of agreement; for I can not see the possibility of the union of the two types of organization (neighborhood and by interests) without the development of partizanships, and I believe that Miss Follett is entirely in error in respect of the true significance of the ballot:² she sees its abuses, but not its meaning, and the plan of national organization she herself suggests (Chapter XXVII.), involving as it does representative commissions, could not be created except by some mode of voting. These issues, to her essential, seem, however, to me wholly secondary: the main point is the need for a new life in the state, built upon new internal understandings; and to this the neighborhood movement leads the way.

But underlying and supporting her practical programme Miss Follett has a political philosophy that is of no less interest. In a narrowly political sense her philosophy of the state is not new: she shares with Aristotle the belief that the essential character of the state is as an organization of the interests of its citizens, and that these are ideal in proportion as they are civic; and her conception of freedom and sovereignty are identical with Rousseau's (the *moi commun* and the *volonté générale*). But Miss Follett has another, a psychological conception, which, while it is similar to the notion of Aristotle and of Rousseau that a man is truly humane only when he is political, is nevertheless more downright in its sociality. The "new psychology" is almost more stressed in her book than is the "new state," and the reason for this is made apparent by the intensity with which she emphasizes her belief that all that is good not only in the state but in human nature must be discovered (or rather

² Perhaps it may be in place to state that the reviewer's conception of the function of "The Ballot" is contained in an article under that title in *Letters to Teachers*, Chicago, 1919.

made) in the working out of our social instincts; "if we can make a moral whole then we shall know whether or not there is one" (p. 334). The fundamental laws of life are two: first, self-perpetuating activity, in which the activity is the element that counts; and second, what Miss Follett calls interpenetration, meaning that the activity always expresses itself in forms of association which are generative relationships between members of groups. Man is so intensely social that, deprived of his sociality, there is left of him nothing that can really live.

The metaphysical background for this is rather startling, for Miss Follett relies with ready assurance at once upon the teachings of James and Bergson and Hegel (the latter via Royce, one is led to suspect). James's conception of the multiple self with its multiple possibilities of liaison, as also his belief in "a continuous life which the universe knows by heart and acts on every instant" (p. 264), the *élan vital* (*passim*), and Hegel's rule that self-transcendence is through a synthesis of self and others whose realization is a "whole"—these are the elements chosen from each of the three philosophers and brought together in a kind of metaphysical sociability. At any rate the collocation will serve to remind us that all three thinkers are of a kind in that all three are primarily humanists, and it may suggest the reflection that eclecticism is justified in so far as it points out that consistency is mainly a matter of emphasis.

Miss Follett's conception of a liaison-inviting self driven on by the vital impulse to the formation of a social Whole gives a satisfactory metaphysical background for her intensely social reading of human nature; and if her psychology were true one might have a faith equal to hers in the power and promise of her political programme. But it is difficult to maintain such a faith. She herself says, and truly: "Man's biological inheritance is not his only life" (p. 38); and I should feel compelled to add, nor is his social inheritance his only humane life. It is not merely that I believe that a certain moment of contention is inevitable and is healthy in human affairs: that moral responsibility often resolves into a willingness to fight rather than into the enthusiasm of an acclaim. Nor is it merely that we have to reckon with rogues among men as among elephants, or again that men banish themselves from society for other motives than selfishness: stagefright, pioneering, the hermit's cell, and the philosopher's closet all own a certain kinship to the grim walls of prisons, and the mere fact that there are "growing pains" connected with the bashful youth's emergence into society shows how far from complete is the mastery of the social element in our total constitution. But the main point is that our ideal interests do not, and I

think never can, square with the political frame, no matter how organized the society nor how close-neighbored its members. Science is more impersonal than politics ever can be; art is more personal than politics can be; and religion is at once more impersonal than science and more personal than art—more Roman and more Protestant than any church. There is an outer metaphysical and an inner psychical context to life untouched by the middle sphere of the political world.

I do not know that I can express this other than in the form of a conviction; its truth is, perhaps, aside from demonstration. Yet I may make my meaning clearer when I say that when I arise in the morning and mingle with men and endeavor to move in their affairs the mode of my conduct and the color of my sympathies correspond, I think, to what Miss Follett would wish of her citizen. Yet I am under no illusions as to the fullness of this experience, nor does it promise me Utopia; for I know that within my experience there is still, both in judgment and in feeling, that which is aloof from the walks of men. It is perhaps no matter of pride; often it is distinctly a regret, or of that motion, most idiosyncratic of all, which we name conscience. But it is sufficient to make me realize that there are ends to which no man nor group of men can guide me, and that there are quests of the spirit of man which lead beyond the range of his foresight.

There are multitudes to-day who, outraged by wars and the cruelties of mortal men, are demanding that we make over our natures, and are hopeful that through economic and political devisings we can make them over. But the roots of human differences strike deeper than economics and deeper than politics. When Helen gat her to the Skaian gates the elders judged: "*οὐ νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ εἰκνήμεδας Ἀχαιοὺς*"—"Reproach is none to Trojans, none to mail-clad Greeks, that for such a woman as this they bear long pains." It is the mode to speak of the ancient struggle for the Dardanelles as, like the modern, a war for trade-routes; but the elders of Troy knew better: it was for Helen that the old war was fought, and it is for another Helen that has been fought the new—for wherever in men's eyes shines the face of an immortal they will break all else to retain the vision.

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